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A CLASH OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: CONFLICTS
BETWEEN THE FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS
The United States Constitution's Fifth and Sixth Amendments protect the
rights of criminal defendants and witnesses. The Fifth Amendment's privi-
lege against self-incrimination protects witnesses from forced self-incrimi-
nation, and the Sixth Amendment provides criminal defendants with the right
to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses. These fundamental rights conflict when a prosecution
witness invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege on cross-examination or
when a defense witness invokes the privilege on direct-examination. A grant
of either use or transactional immunity would remove the potential for self-
incrimination, but courts are split on whether they possess the authority to
grant such immunity to defense witnesses. This Note examines the judicial
approaches to resolving the conflicts between the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment, and it analyzes the factors that favor and those that oppose a grant of
immunity to defense witnesses. This Note concludes that defense witnesses
should be granted use immunity whenever their testimony might be exculpa-
tory.
INTRODUCTION
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution pro-
vide a criminal defendant's most fundamental rights. The Fifth Amendment
states, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in, any
criminal case to be a witness against himself,"' and the Sixth Amendment
guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him [and] to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."2
' U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court held in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,
6 (1964), that the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination privilege applies to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Supreme Court held in Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967), that the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause applies
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment; in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403
(1965), it found that the Confrontation Clause applies to the states through the Four-
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Although these amendments provide for the preeminent protections af-
forded criminal defendants in the United States, a witness's invocation of
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination can impede a
defendant's presentation of evidence.3 For example, a witness testifying
against a defendant may invoke the privilege upon cross-examination by the
defense, thereby denying the defense the right to effective cross-examina-
tion.4 Further, a witness who might provide exculpatory testimony may
invoke the privilege, thereby denying the defendant the ability to present
evidence in her defense.
This Note examines the various judicial approaches to the problems that
arise when Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections conflict in criminal tri-
als. Part L.A addresses the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege, includ-
ing the circumstances under which the privilege may be available and the
two types of immunity-use and transactional-that may be granted to pre-
vent invocation of the privilege. Part I.B analyzes the scope of the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses.
Part II examines conflicts between the guarantees the two amendments
provide. Generally, only prosecutors have been able to request grants of
immunity.' Some courts, however, have identified a Sixth Amendment right
under which, given certain circumstances, a defense witness may be immu-
teenth Amendment.
3 "An accused may for all practical purposes be denied the right to compulsory
process by virtue of the countervailing impact of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Where the two rights are in conflict, the privilege against self-incrimination has pre-
vailed." 3 JOSEPH G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 18.3 (2d ed.
1986 & Supp. 1995).
" The most recent famous occurrence of this conflict occurred in September 1995 in
the double-murder trial of football star O.J. Simpson. People v. Simpson, 1995 WL
704381 (L.A. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 1995). In March 1995, the prosecution in the Simpson
trial called former police detective Mark Fuhrman to testify against Simpson. William
Claiborne, Ito Orders Rebuttal Before Defense Rests; Photos of Simpson in Gloves
Shown; Cochran Awaits Fuhrman Appeal Ruling, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1995, at A3.
Fuhrman linked Simpson to the murder scene by testifying that he had found a bloody
glove at Simpson's Brentwood estate. Id. Fuhrman also testified that he had not used
racial epithets and had never planted evidence. Id. Defense attorneys later discovered a
set of tapes in which Fuhrman used racial epithets and spoke of planting evidence. Id.
When the defense attempted to cross-examine Fuhrman regarding his earlier testimony,
including the manufacture and planting of evidence, Fuhrman invoked the privilege
against self-incrimination. Id. Defense attorney Gerald Uelmen argued that by allowing
Fuhrman to invoke the privilege, Judge Lance A. Ito had deprived Simpson of his Sixth
Amendment right to cross-examine the former detective. Nevertheless, Judge Ito reject-
ed the defense's requests that the court either (a) strike all references to the glove from
the record, (b) grant Fuhrman prosecutorial immunity, or (c) tell the jury that Fuhrman
refused to testify. Id. The California Second District Court of Appeal and the California
Supreme Court upheld Judge Ito's decision. See id.
' For a discussion of immunity grants, see infra Part I.A.3.
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nized.6 Part II discusses the policy arguments regarding immunity grants
and concludes that use immunity best preserves the rights of witnesses, de-
fendants, and the prosecution, as well as the state's interest in prosecuting
those criminals who may serve as witnesses in trials held prior to their own.
Part III concludes by recommending that defense witnesses be granted use
immunity whenever their testimony might be exculpatory.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES TO DEFENDANTS AND WITNESSES
A. The Scope of the Fifth Amendment Privilege
1. The Availability of the Privilege
The Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination privilege protects a defendant
from becoming a witness against himself in any criminal prosecution." Vari-
ous policy considerations support the privilege, including the basic tenet that
defendants are presumed innocent and thus are not required to prove their
innocence by testifying on their own behalf.8
See infra Part II.A.
Thus, a non-defendant witness may invoke the privilege if she justifiably fears
subsequent prosecution. The Supreme Court has held that a witness asserting the privi-
lege against self-incrimination must be "confronted by substantial and 'real,' and not
merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination." Rogers v. United States, 340
U.S. 367, 374 (1951); see United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 128 (1980);
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968).'
A witness may invoke the privilege even if the feared potential prosecution is in a
jurisdiction other than the one in which she is called to testify. Examples include prose-
cution under the laws of a foreign country, under the laws of another state, under state
laws if the witness is testifying in a federal court, or under federal laws if the witness is
testifying in a state court. 1 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON Evi-
DENCE § 123 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
' Several additional justifications have been offered for the privilege. Wigmore's
treatise on evidence lists twelve:
(1) It protects the innocent defendant from convicting himself by a bad perfor-
mance on the witness stand. (2) It avoids burdening the courts with false testimo-
ny. (3) It encourages third-party witnesses to appear and testify by removing the
fear that they might be compelled to incriminate themselves .... (4) The privilege
is a recognition of the practical limits of governmental power; truthful self-in-
criminating answers cannot be compelled, so why try .... (5) The privilege pre-
vents procedures of the kinds used by the infamous courts of Star Chamber, High
Commission and Inquisition. (6) It is justified by history, whose tests it has stood;
the tradition which it has created is a satisfactory one .... (7) The privilege pre-
serves respect for the legal process by avoiding situations which are likely to
degenerate into undignified, uncivilized and regrettable scenes. (8) It spurs the
prosecutor to do a complete and competent independent investigation .... (9) The
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Because the privilege protects its holders only against the risk of crimi-
nal liability, upon removal of the liability risk, the privilege no longer ex-
ists.9 Thus, a witness who has been pardoned, acquitted, or granted immu-
nity no longer may invoke the privilege as to questions concerning the given
act.1" Similarly, if the statute (or period) of limitations has lapsed, the wit-
ness no longer possesses the privilege regarding that act.1
Difficulties arise when a witness invokes the privilege after her convic-
tion. The Supreme Court held in Estelle v. Smith that a convicted witness
may invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege when she fears that her testimo-
ny may increase her risk of receiving a death sentence. 3 Lower courts gen-
erally have held that the privilege protects a convicted defendant against
compelled disclosures that may increase the severity of a sentence, regard-
less of whether the death penalty is a potential sentence. 14
Furthermore, courts have recognized that if a direct appeal from a con-
viction is pending or remains available, any disclosure a defendant might
make could incriminate her upon retrial. 5 For this reason, courts typically
have held that defendants retain the right to invoke the privilege until they
exhaust their appeals or the time for appeal expires. 6
privilege aids in the frustration of "bad laws" and "bad procedures," especially in
the area of political and religious belief .... [(10)] The privilege, together with
the requirement of probable cause prior to prosecution, protects the individual
from being prosecuted for crimes of insufficient notoriety or seriousness to be of
real concern to society .... (11) The privilege prevents torture and other inhu-
mane treatment .... (12) The privilege contributes toward a fair state-individual
balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good
cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest
with the individual to shoulder the entire load.
8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (McNaughton rev. 1961 & Supp. 1995) (cita-
tions omitted).
9 MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 121.
10 Id.; see infra Part I.A.3 (discussing immunity in detail).
11 MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 121.
12 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
13 Id. at 462.
14 See United States v. Paris, 827 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing United States
v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1235 (9th Cir. 1985)); United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582
F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1005 (1978); accord. United States v.
De La Cruz, 996 F.2d 1307, 1313 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 936 (1993).
15 See, e.g., United States v. Warfield, 97 F.3d 1014, 1020 (8th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1119 (1997); United States v. Argomaniz, 925 F.2d 1349, 1352 (11th
Cir. 1991).
16 MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 121; see, e.g., Ellison v. State, 528 A.2d 1271, 1278
(Md. 1987) (noting that although the statistical likelihood of a successful appeal is low,
the possibility of a retrial being granted is not so remote as to constitute a negligible
risk); accord. State v. Rucas, 734 P.2d 673, 676 (Kan. 1987); Adkins v. State, 557 A.2d
203, 207 (Md. 1989).
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2. Invocation of the Privilege and Waiver
Non-defendant witnesses, unlike defendants, do not have a right to re-
fuse to testify. As McCormick on Evidence notes, "Non-defendant witnesses
are privileged only to decline to respond to inquiries, not to be free from
those inquiries designed to elicit responses self-incriminatory in nature." 1
7
Thus, a witness must invoke the privilege in response to each question that
could yield a self-incriminatory answer.
The trial judge, not the witness, determines the merits of a privilege
claim by determining whether the witness is subject to criminal liability. 8
For this reason, witnesses must invoke the privilege to specific questions;
they may not assert a "blanket" privilege. The judge then looks to whether
the questions asked justified invocation. 9 Because compelled testimony
could force a potential criminal defendant to testify against himself, appel-
late courts usually grant trial judges substantial latitude in permitting invoca-
tion of the privilege. As the Seventh Circuit recognized, a trial court may
allow a witness to invoke the privilege "[u]nless it is perfectly clear from
the proof that the testimony cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate
the witness."'
A witness may testify to certain facts and then invoke the privilege
17 MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 137.
18 See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (holding that the court
determines whether a witness may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination).
9 As a general rule, such a determination "ordinarily requires that a particularized
inquiry into the reasons for the assertion of the privilege be made." United States v.
Pratt, 913 F.2d 982, 990 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735,
741 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028
(1991); see North River Ins. Co. v. Stefanou, 831 F.2d 484, 487 (4th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1007 (1988)). Furthermore, in determining the reasonableness of a
privilege claim, a judge may take into account facts that are not in evidence. Hoffman
v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 487 (1951).
20 Gleason v. Welborn, 42 F.3d 1107, 1109 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Hoffman, 341
U.S. at 488), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1961 (1995).
Judicial concern for preventing a witness from incriminating herself can result in a
judge warning a witness that her testimony could lead to criminal prosecution. A judge
may also choose to halt the trial and appoint counsel to the witness to explain to her the
implications of her testimony and her constitutional rights. Judges must be especially
cautious in such circumstances, however, for, as the Supreme Court noted in Webb v.
Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972), a trial judge's efforts to protect a defense witness-in
this case, from prosecution for perjury-may impermissibly intrude upon a defendant's
right to produce evidence. See 3 COOK, supra note 3, § 18.2 (discussing Webb and its
effects). For a discussion of a judge's options when a witness appears to be in jeopardy
of incriminating herself, see MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 138, and WIGMORE, supra
note 8, § 2269.
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against self-incrimination in response to subsequent questions.21 In Rogers
v. United States,22 however, the Supreme Court held that a witness who
voluntarily reveals self-incriminatory facts without invoking the privilege
forfeits the right to invoke the privilege when later confronted with ques-
tions regarding details of her incriminating testimony.23 Nevertheless, most
lower courts allow invocation of the privilege when an answer would in-
crease the risk of incrimination.' Thus, a witness's potentially incriminat-
ing testimony does not result in a waiver of the privilege against self-in-
crimination on matters relating solely to credibility, such as the commission
of other unrelated crimes.'
3. Grants of Immunity
A witness who receives immunity may not invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination. Immunity generally is made available for prosecutorial
use through statutory provisions.26 A witness may be granted one of two
21 This option generally is not available to defendants. Unlike a non-defendant wit-
ness, a defendant may refuse to be subjected to questioning. For this reason, once a
defendant agrees to testify, to a large extent she forfeits her Fifth Amendment privilege.
MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 140.
22 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
Id. at 373. The decision leaves unclear whether the witness's waiver must be
made knowingly, as is often the requirement for forfeiture of a constitutional right. For
a discussion of this aspect of the decision, see MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 140.
24 See, e.g., In re Seper, 705 F.2d 1499, 1501 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that although
a witness had disclosed information that would incriminate him, disclosure of additional
information would "further incriminate" him by providing links in the essential chain of
proof should the government choose to prosecute him). The Ninth Circuit based this
holding on its previous analysis of Rogers in Hashagen v. United States, 283 F.2d 345
(9th Cir. 1960), in which it concluded that "'an admission of a criminating fact may
waive the privilege as to the details of that fact so long as they do not further incrimi-
nate, but where those details would so incriminate, the privilege is not waived."' Seper,
705 F.2d at 1501 (quoting Hashagen, 283 F.2d at 352).
2 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (providing that "[t]he giving of testimony ...
does not operate as a waiver of the ... privilege against self-incrimination when exam-
ined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility").
26 Examples of several hundred state and federal immunity statutes may be found in
Wigmore's treatise on Evidence. WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2281 n.11.
Like most of the state statutes, the federal immunity statute requires that the prose-
cutor (here, a United States Attorney) assert in a written application to the court that the
witness's testimony may be "necessary to the public interest" and that the witness is
otherwise likely to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. 18 U.S.C. § 6003
(1994). A perfunctory hearing is then held at which the court will routinely grant the
application for immunity. HENRY I. SUBIN ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL PRACTICE:
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE § 12.7 (1992).
Judicially granted immunity, which is recognized by courts only in limited circum-
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types of immunity-use or transactional. Transactional immunity provides
that the government may not prosecute a witness for any transactions about
which she testifies." In 1896, the Supreme Court upheld transactional im-
munity as an adequate protection of a witness's Fifth Amendment self-in-
crimination interest.'
Use immunity, which the Supreme Court upheld in 1972 in Kastigar v.
United States,29 protects a witness against only use of compelled testimony
and against admission of evidence obtained through a lead the testimony
provided. Use immunity does not prevent subsequent prosecution for an
offense if the prosecutor utilizes evidence obtained independently of the
testimony, such as evidence acquired prior to the testimony or evidence that
is otherwise wholly independent from that produced in the witness's testi-
mony.3" The prosecution bears the burden of proving that any evidence
offered against a defendant who was previously granted use immunity was
obtained independently of the former witness's compelled testimony.3"
Use immunity most commonly is granted in federal trials because feder-
al legislation grants such immunity.32 Several state court decisions, how-
ever, have held that use immunity provides insufficient protections to wit-
nesses.33 These courts believe that only transactional immunity can truly
protect a witness's Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-incrimination. State
courts that have rejected use immunity have expressed a fear that "in prac-
stances, if at all, is discussed at infra Part II.A.2.
27 For a discussion of the Supreme Court's initial treatment of transactional immuni-
ty statutes, see R. Erik Lillquist, Note, Constitutional Rights at the Junction: the Emer-
gence of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Interstate Commerce Act, 81
VA. L. REV. 1989, 2032-36 (1995).
28 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 610 (1896).
29 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
30 Erwin N. Griswald, Fifth Amendment, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SU-
PREME COURT, 293, 295 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992); see, e.g., United States v.
Poindexter, 698 F. Supp. 300 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding that the independent counsel pros-
ecuting the case against the defendants, including Lt. Col. Oliver North, met the heavy
burden of demonstrating that it obtained the evidence offered against the defendants
independently of their compelled, immunized congressional testimony).
"' Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460. Nevertheless, most courts hold that the prosecution's
"mere assertion" that it obtained the offered evidence independently is sufficient to meet
this burden. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 143.
32 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (1994) (granting United States attorneys the authority
to seek use immunity for witnesses). In passing this statute in 1970, Congress repealed
earlier immunity provisions, including those providing transactional immunity. 18
U.S.C. § 6001 (1994).
" See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 143; see, e.g., State v. Gonzalez, 853 P.2d 526,
530 (Alaska 1993); State v. Miyasaki, 614 P.2d 915, 923 (Haw. 1980); Attorney Gener-
al v. Colleton, 444 N.E.2d 915, 920-21 (Mass. 1982); State v. Soriano, 693 P.2d 26
(Or. 1984).
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tice there is insufficient assurance that a prosecution permitted under
Kastigar will in fact be based upon actually independent evidence. '
B. The Scope of the Sixth Amendment Guarantees
1. Confrontation Clause
The primary purpose of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause is
"to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination. 3 5 Cross-
examination allows a defendant to cast doubts upon the testimony offered
against her by allowing the defense to probe the witness to determine bias,
dishonesty, and basis of knowledge.36 The Supreme Court has held not on-
ly that the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is fundamental to a
defendant's right to due process and a fair trial 7 but also that "[c]ross-ex-
amination of a witness is a matter of right.,
38
2. Compulsory Process Clause
The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of compulsory process ideally should
give a defendant, who is presumed innocent until proven guilty, at least as
much access to governmental means for obtaining testimony as the prosecu-
tion possesses.3 Thus, several commentators and a few courts have argued
that compulsory process should allow defendants access to the key prosecu-
torial tool for obtaining the self-incriminating, and perhaps exculpatory,
testimony of witnesses-witness immunity.4" The next section addresses
these arguments as well as judicial approaches to the conflicts between a
witness's Fifth Amendment privilege and a defendant's Sixth Amendment
guarantees.
II. CONFLICTs BETWEEN THE FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS
According to Professor Cook's treatise on the constitutional rights of
defendants, "An accused may for all practical purposes be denied the right
to compulsory process by virtue of the countervailing impact of the privi-
34 MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 143.
35 WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 1395.
36 See COOK, supra note 3, § 18.10 (discussing the scope of cross-examination).
31 See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-95 (1973).
38 Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691 (1931).
9 Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 168 (1974).
40 See infra Part II.A.1.
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lege against self-incrimination. Where the two rights are in conflict, the
privilege against self-incrimination has prevailed."'" Courts that have ad-
dressed this conflict agree.42 In Kastigar, the Supreme Court offered justifi-
cations for this preference:
The power to compel testimony is not absolute. There are a
number of exemptions from the testimonial duty, the most
important of which is the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination. The privilege reflects a com-
plex of our fundamental values and aspirations, and marks an
important advance in the development of our liberty.43
Although a witness's Fifth Amendment privilege generally outweighs a
defendant's Sixth Amendment privilege, certain judicial remedies may pre-
serve an accused's Sixth Amendment rights. The available remedies differ
depending on whether a defense witness or a prosecution witness subject to
cross-examination invokes the privilege.
A. Invocation of the Self-Incrimination Privilege by a Defense Witness
4' 3 COOK, supra note 3, § 18.3.
42 The Ninth Circuit held that "[tihe Sixth Amendment right of an accused to com-
pulsory process to secure the attendance of a witness does not include the right to com-
pel the witness to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege." United States v. Trejo-
Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.) (citing United States v. Gay, 567 F.2d 916 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 (1978)), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1005 (1978); see, e.g.,
United States v. Robaina, 39 F.3d 858, 862 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that a "defendant's
right to compulsory process does not include the right to compel a witness to waive his
or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination") (citing Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972)); United States v. Boyett, 923 F.2d 378, 379 (5th Cir.)
("When the [Fifth Amendment right of a witness and the Sixth Amendment rights of a
defendant] are in conflict, we have stated that 'an accused's right to compulsory process
must give way to the witness'[s] Fifth Amendment privilege not to give testimony that
would tend to incriminate him."') (quoting United States v. Khan, 728 F.2d 676, 678
(5th Cir. 1984)), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 809 (1991); United States v. Thornton, 733 F.2d
121, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Reese, 561 F.2d 894, 899-900 (D.C.
Cir. 1977)); Johnson v. Johnson, 375 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Commonwealth
v. Francis, 375 N.E.2d. 1221 (Mass.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 872 (1978).
43 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 444-45 (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,
55 (1964); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956); Blair v. United States,
250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919); ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7
(1955); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 8, §§ 2192, 2197). In Kastigar, the Court noted that it
"has been zealous to safeguard the values that underlie the privilege [against compulso-
ry self-incrimination]." Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 445 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 443-44 (1966); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)).
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The sole remedy to preserve both a witness's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and a defendant's compulsory process right to
obtain witnesses in her favor is to grant immunity to the witness." Policy
arguments in favor of such grants are compelling, but given the lack of
statutory provisions for such a grant, courts have been reluctant to recognize
the right based "merely" on Sixth Amendment grounds.45
1. Grants of Immunity for Defense Witnesses
Defense witnesses may invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination if they justifiably fear that their testimony will be self-in-
criminating.46 If a prosecutor desires to present a witness's potentially self-
incriminating testimony in order to help prove a defendant's guilt, she gen-
erally has the statutory power to receive immunity for the witness and to
compel the witness to testify.47 Defense attorneys lack such statutory pow-
er.48 Some commentators, however, have argued vigorously that compul-
sory process requires that defense attorneys be given equal access to this
tool for gaining important evidence.
As one commentator noted,
The constitutional right of the accused to obtain immunity
for his witnesses falls squarely within the language and pur-
pose of the compulsory process clause .... [The clause] was
adopted to give the defendant at least as much access as that
of the prosecution to governmental devices for obtaining tes-
timony .... [T]he defendant has a presumptive right to ob-
tain immunity for his witnesses on an equal basis with the
prosecution .... The public interest in each case is to deter-
mine the truth, and the standard for granting use immunity in
each case should be the same, namely, whether it is 'neces-
sary to the public interest.' [quoting 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b)(1)
4 For a discussion of immunity, see supra Part I.A.3.
• See infra Part II.A.2; see also infra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing
the lack of statutorily provided immunity for defense witnesses).
46 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
4 All 50 states, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, have statutes
allowing prosecutors in certain circumstances to seek immunity for witnesses. For a list
of these statutes, see WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2281 n.11. Federal law also provides
for prosecutorially requested immunity. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (1996); see supra note
26. Additionally, some courts have found inherent power in prosecutors to grant immu-
nity. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 143.
"' Neither Congress nor the state legislatures have enacted statutes permitting de-
fense attorneys to seek immunity for their clients' witnesses. See MCCORMICK, supra
note 7, § 143.
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(1970) (amended 1996)]. Once the state makes immunity
available to the prosecution it should not be permitted arbi-
trarily to withhold it from the defense.49
These arguments are particularly persuasive when there is a substantial
likelihood that a potential witness might provide exculpatory testimony.
Without defense witness immunity, a witness who might exonerate an inno-
cent defendant may refuse- to answer the necessary incriminating questions
and thus allow the conviction of an innocent defendant.
Several arguments, however, support the denial of equal access to grants
of immunity. As the Fourth Circuit noted, "A person suspected of crime
should not be empowered to give his confederates an immunity bath."50
Permitting defendants to call their friends and/or co-conspirators as witness-
es and then forcing the court or the prosecution to immunize them could
lead to great injustices. For example, a friend, as an immunized witness,
could help a guilty defendant go free by implicating herself in the crime. If
the witness had been granted use immunity and was tried later for the of-
fense, the former defendant could reciprocate by implicating herself in her
friend's trial.5" Because of the double jeopardy rule, the former defendant
could do so without fear of further prosecution.52
The safeguard preventing such miscarriages of justice is the jury's role
in weighing the evidence and in determining whether to believe the wit-
ness.53 Defense witnesses are subject to vigorous cross-examination by the
prosecutor, who will likely attempt to show the witness's bias or lack of
honesty.
Furthermore, if a witness receives only use immunity, she may still be
prosecuted for the crime about which she testified. Use immunity prohibits
the prosecution only from introducing the immunized testimony into evi-
dence or from presenting any evidence obtained through a lead provided by
the testimony.54 When the prosecution grants use immunity, it loses noth-
ing; the incriminating statements that it cannot use against an immunized
witness are statements that, absent immunity, the witness would never have
made because she otherwise would have invoked her Fifth Amendment
9 Westen, supra note 39, at 168-70 (citations omitted).
5 In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1222 (4th Cir. 1973).
5' If the witness was granted transactional immunity, she could not be tried for the
admitted crime at all. See supra Part II.A.2.
52 The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall "be subject for the same of-
fence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. For an expla-
nation of the double jeopardy protection, see Greene v. United States,. 355 U.S. 184,
185 (1957).
"3 As fact finders, juries (or the trial court in non-jury trials) determine the credibili-
ty of witnesses and, subsequently, the weight that their testimony should be given.
', See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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privilege. Indeed, in Kastigar, the Supreme Court concluded that "[use]
immunity ... leaves the witness and the prosecutorial authorities in substan-
tially the same position as if the witness had claimed the Fifth Amendment
privilege."55 Thus, witnesses would be disinclined to lie in order to help a
friend if they were aware that they could be prosecuted for the crime.
Granting defense witnesses use immunity may inconvenience prosecu-
tors. For example, if a prosecutor intends to prosecute a witness later, she
may need to gather evidence against the witness and to certify it under seal
so as to fulfill the requirement that evidence be obtained independently.56
Nevertheless, as noted earlier, prosecutors generally need only assert that
they obtained the evidence independently to fulfill the Supreme Court's
requirement of independence. 7
In jurisdictions that currently recognize only transactional immunity,
however, a prosecutor loses the ability to prosecute a witness who received
immunity." A weak response to this problem is that prosecutors may sim-
ply decide that a given defendant or a given witness is more "worthy" of
prosecution." If the prosecutor believes she would have a stronger case
against the witness, she may dismiss the charges against the defendant and
prosecute the witness. Similarly, if it is "better" to prosecute the defendant,
the prosecutor may pursue the case against the defendant and sacrifice the
ability to prosecute the witness.
2. Judicially Ordered or Granted Immunity
Several courts have held that defendants have no right to obtain either
type of immunity for their wintesses. ° Furthermore, courts that recognize
judicially granted immunity generally have held that only transactional im-
munity may be granted because the statutory language of use immunity
provisions provides only for prosecutorial requests for such immunity."
5 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972); see Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
516 The prosecutor may always seek a postponement of the current trial in order to
obtain evidence against a particular witness. See Westen, supra note 39, at 169.
" See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
51 See supra text accompanying note 27.
9 See Westen, supra note 39, at 170 n.477.
See, e.g., United States v. Robaina, 39 F.3d 858, 863 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that
"'[j]udicial' immunity has not been recognized in this Circuit"); United States v.
Allstate Mortgage Corp., 507 F.2d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that regardless of
whether use or transactional immunity is sought, only United States attorneys may seek
orders granting immunity in federal courts), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975). Never-
theless, the Eighth Circuit suggested in United States v. Hardrich, 707 F.2d 992, 993-94
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 991 (1983), that judicial immunity may be appropriate
if the proffered testimony is clearly exculpatory.
6 See, e.g., Robaina, 39 F.3d at 863 (concluding that "[t]he Supreme Court has held
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Judicially ordered immunity, whereby a judge orders a prosecutor to request
immunity for a defense witness, has met similar resistance. The Ninth Cir-
cuit, for example, held that "an accused [is not] entitled to compel a prose-
cutor to grant immunity to a potential defense witness to get him to testi-
fy."
62
Five circuits recognize judicially ordered or granted immunity. 63 The
Third Circuit acknowledged judicially granted and judicially ordered transac-
that statutory immunization of a witness, or use immunity, can only be granted upon the
request of the Attorney General.") (citing United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 616
(1984)). The Eighth Circuit quoted the Supreme Court's decision in Doe: "'We decline
to extend the jurisdiction of courts to include the prospective grant of use immunity in
the absence of the formal request that the statute requires."' Id. (quoting Doe, 465 U.S.
at 616); accord. United States v. Doddington, 822 F.2d 818, 821 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing
Doe, 465 U.S. at 616).
62 United States v. Paris, 827 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v.
Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.) (citing United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d
1079, 1081 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976)), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1005
(1978)).
63 The First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits recognize immunity for de-
fense witnesses. See United States v. Pratt, 913 F.2d 982, 991 (1st Cir. 1990); United
States v. Todaro, 744 F.2d 5, 9 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1213 (1985);
Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 970 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Klauber,
611 F.2d 512, 517-19 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980); Alessio, 528
F.2d at 1080-82.
Six of the federal circuits have refused to recognize judicial authority to grant de-
fense witness immunity. See United States v. Cuthel, 903 F.2d 1381, 1384 (11th Cir.
1990); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 526 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1158 (1985); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 638-39 (5th Cir. Unit B), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1008 (1982); In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 478-79 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); United States v. Graham, 548 F.2d 1302, 1315 (8th Cir.
1977); Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S.
921 (1967).
The Tenth Circuit has not yet recognized immunity for defense witnesses, but in
United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1310 (10th Cir. 1987), the court left open "the
possibility that 'where the prosecutor's denial of immunity is a deliberate attempt to
distort the fact finding process, a court could force the government to choose between
conferring immunity or suffering acquittal."' (quoting Smith, 615 F.2d at 968).
For an argument that courts are the logical source of the immunity grant, see Jana
Winograde, Comment, Jailhouse Informants and the Need for Judicial Use Immunity in
Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 78 CAL. L. REV. 755, 777-79 (1990).
Several state courts have recognized a right to defense witness immunity. See State
v. Montgomery, 467 So. 2d 387, 390-96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Summers,
485 A.2d 335, 336-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984); People v. Shapiro, 409 N.E.2d
897, 904-05 (N.Y. 1980); State v. Broady, 321 N.E.2d 890, 894-96 (Ohio Ct. App.
1974). For an analysis of one state's approach to defense witness immunity, see Thom-
as D. Dinackus, Comment, Defense Witness Immunity in New York, 71 CORNELL L.
REV. 890 (1986).
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tional immunity in Virgin Islands v. Smith. 4 In Smith, the court held that a
defense witness should have been granted immunity by the trial court.65
Previously, in United States v. Herman,66 the Third Circuit recognized the
possibility of such an immunity grant but had not ordered one. The court in
Herman recognized two situations in which the Due Process Clause might
compel a grant of immunity to defense witnesses.67
The first situation involves government actions taken to deny use immu-
nity to defendants with "the deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact
finding process."6 In such a case, a court has the remedial power to force
the prosecutor to request immunity for the witness by threatening to order
an acquittal, even if the testimony is neither exculpatory nor otherwise es-
sential to the defendant's case.69 The Third Circuit reaffirmed this right in
Smith and reiterated that the defendant bears the burden of proving such
misconduct.7"
The second situation that the Third Circuit recognized in Herman and
reaffirmed in Smith as justifying defense witness immunity occurs when a
witness's "'testimony is essential to an effective defense." ''7' The court held
that under such circumstances, a defendant's compulsory process right re-
quires a grant of judicially fashioned immunity.72 This immunity differs
from the compelled grant of immunity in the above prosecutorial misconduct
situation. Although a court may "twist the prosecutor's hand" by forcing her
to choose between accepting an acquittal or requesting immunity for a de-
fense witness, a court faced with a witness who possesses "testimony [that]
is essential to an effective defense" has the power to decree immunity it-
self.73 The Third Circuit held that unlike prosecutorially requested immu-
nity, which is authorized by statutes, the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory
Process Clause authorizes judicially decreed immunity.74
- 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
65 Id. at 974.
66 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979).
67 Id. at 1204.
68 Id.
69 Smith, 615 F.2d at 964, 969 n.7.
70 The Third Circuit held that "'the evidentiary showing required to justify reversal
on that ground must be a substantial one. The defendant must be prepared to show that
the government's decisions were made with the deliberate intention of distorting the
judicial fact finding process."' Id. at 968 (quoting Herman, 589 F.2d at 1204).
71 Id. at 969 (quoting Herman, 589 F.2d at 1204). The Circuit did not supply criteria
for determining what type of testimony qualifies as "essential." Id. For an examination
of the narrow interpretation of "essential" utilized by the First Circuit, see infra notes
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The First Circuit in United States v. Prate5 also recognized that defen-
dants are entitled to a grant of immunity for a witness if the judge finds
prosecutorial misconduct or believes a witness's testimony is essential to an
effective defense.76 The First Circuit, however, appears to have a narrow
view of when a defendant can seek witness immunity under either theory.
In United States v. De La Cruz, 7 a post-Pratt case, the First Circuit
upheld a trial court's decision to allow a co-conspirator to invoke his Fifth
Amendment privilege to avoid testifying as a witness for the defense despite
the fact that he had already been convicted and was merely awaiting sen-
tencing,78 and, more importantly, despite the fact that the appellate court
recognized that "it [was] surely possible that [the witness] would have ex-
culpated [the defendant] entirely."79 The First Circuit concluded that al-
though "the direct testimony of [the witness] . . . might have been impor-
tant, even decisive[,] ... whatever the cost to [the defendant], . . . [the
witness] was entitled to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege if testifying
might incriminate him.
80
The First Circuit never directly addressed the "effective defense" theory.
The court noted that the defendant could have testified to the same exculpa-
tory facts that he sought to introduce through the witness. Thus, the court
likely believed that the existence of this alternative rendered the witness's
testimony "non-essential." This "alternative," however, is undesirable be-
cause ultimately it might force a defendant to testify against herself or to
invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury. This
"alternative" thus runs counter to the Fifth Amendment principle against
compelling a witness-here, the defendant-to testify against herself.
Furthermore, although in dictum the First Circuit recognized the avail-
ability of immunity for defense witnesses based on "prosecutorial miscon-
duct,"'" it noted that only in "rare cases [will] the denial of immunity com-
prise a miscarriage of justice."82 Because prosecutors are likely to avoid
actions that place them in such a position, few if any instances will likely
arise in which courts will grant immunity under this provision. As a result,
7' 913 F.2d 982 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991).
76 Id. at 991 (citing United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1190-93 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845 (1990); Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 969 (3d Cir.
1980); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 1976)).
996 F.2d 1307 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 936 (1993).
78 Id. at 1312.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Under the First Circuit's scheme, a prosecutor's gratuitous threats to prosecute a
witness if she testified would qualify as misconduct warranting a grant of immunity. Id.
at 1313. Given the First Circuit's high threshold for defense immunity grants, however,
it seems unlikely, that less egregious misconduct would warrant an immunity grant.
82 Id. at 1313-14.
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given the First Circuit's construction of when testimony is "essential," it
appears that grants of immunity to defense witnesses under any circumstanc-
es will be rare. If all the circuits adopt the First Circuit's narrow constraints,
the remedy will be available so rarely that its existence may be almost irrel-
evant.
3. Continuances
Under limited circumstances, a continuance may preserve a witness's
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and a defendant's
Sixth Amendment compulsory process rights.8 3 As noted earlier, a witness
may invoke the privilege only so long as there exists a potential for criminal
liability." Because there is no potential for criminal liability, for example,
for an acquitted witness or for one who has exhausted her appeals, a delay
in a defendant's trial may permit compelled testimony from a witness who
previously invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege. A defendant in such
circumstances could then request a continuance and obtain the testimony of
the witness.Circumstances in which a continuance would prove valuable seem to be
limited. Although a defendant may request a continuance until the witness
has been tried, the judicial process is slow, and the witness might not be
tried for months or even years.86 Furthermore, courts have held that a con-
victed witness retains the right to invoke the privilege not only until after
sentencing but also until she exhausts all of her appeals.8 7 Similarly, if a
witness has not been prosecuted, a continuance potentially would be re-
quired to last until the statute of limitations on the crime has lapsed. Thus,
continuances are impractical, and a court would not likely grant a continu-
ance in such circumstances. 8
"3 See, e.g., Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1086-89 (5th
Cir. 1979).
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
85 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. Barnett, 330 F.2d 369, 425 (5th Cir. 1963) (noting the
slowness of the judicial process).
17 See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
88 In any event, when immunity is not granted, and a continuance would allow a
witness awaiting sentencing to testify after sentencing, a court is not required, sua spon-
te, to grant a continuance. See, e.g., United States v. Paris, 827 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir.
1987) ("To obtain a continuance a defendant must move for one.") (citing United States
v. Steffen, 641 F.2d 591, 595 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 943 (1981)).
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4. Allowing the Defense To Call a Witness Who Will Invoke the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination
a. Invocation During Initial Direct Examination
One final conflict involving a witness's Fifth Amendment privilege and
a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process occurs when a
defendant is either denied immunity for a defense witness or does not seek a
grant or order of immunity. Defense counsel may want to call a witness it
realizes will invoke the privilege solely to compel the assertion of the privi-
lege in the jury's presence. 9 A court that is aware of such a plan need not
allow the witness to make the invocation in the jury's presence.9 Courts
base this decision on the generally accepted principle that juries may not
draw inferences from the fact that a witness invokes the privilege against
self-incrimination.91 Courts may avoid invocation of the privilege in the
jury's presence by holding in camera proceedings to determine whether a
witness intends to invoke the privilege. If the witness indicates that inten-
tion, the judge may request that the witness invoke the privilege at that time,
outside the jury's presence.92
89 See Michael Cook, Comment, Denying a Criminal Defendant the Opportunity to
Call a Witness Who Will Invoke His Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion, 54 DENY. L.J. 205 (1977) (arguing that a defendant's attempt to raise inferences in
her own favor by calling witnesses she knows will invoke the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege does not present evidentiary problems and that such attempts should be allowed if
they are offered to help establish the defendant's innocence).
' 3 COOK, supra note 3, § 18.3; see, e.g., United States v. Vigil, 561 F.2d 1316
(9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 934 (1977); United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1053 (1974).
" Although commentators have argued that defense counsel should be allowed to
call such witnesses to the stand because the judge, not the witness, is the final arbiter of
when a response falls within the scope of the privilege, courts have addressed this argu-
ment by holding hearings outside the presence of the jury for the purpose of determin-
ing the witness's ability to invoke ihe privilege. WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2272.
Some jurisdictions, however, allow such inferences. For example, in Brink's Inc. v.
New York, 717 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1983), the Second Circuit held that a trial judge may
instruct jurors that they may draw inferences based on a witness's assertion of the privi-
lege. See also Cook, supra note 89, at 210-19 (arguing in favor of such inferences).
' See Cook, supra note 89, at 211. Cook also noted that requiring a witness to take
the stand and assert the privilege serves the additional purpose of testing the witness's
resolve to stand on the privilege. Id. at 211 n.36.
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b. Invocation During Cross-Examination
A witness may testify for the defense without asserting the privilege on
direct but then invoke the privilege upon cross-examination. The Fourth
Circuit's approach to such actions is typical:
The defendant's right to present witnesses in his own de-
fense ... does not carry with it the right to immunize the
witness from reasonable and appropriate cross-examination.
Neither a defendant's right of confrontation nor his right to
present witnesses in his own defense is so absolute as to
require a subversion of even more fundamental principles
that animate our adversary system.93
Testimony may not be stricken, however, if a witness asserts the privi-
lege solely on matters relating to credibility.94 If a witness invokes the priv-
ilege as to non-collateral matters, most courts suggest that striking only por-
tions of the testimony is "the more reasonable remedy," but they ac-
knowledge that striking all of the testimony is "the only appropriate remedy
when refusal to answer the questions of the cross-examiner frustrates the
purpose of the process.
95
3 Lawson v. Murray, 837 F.2d 653, 655-56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831
(1988). The Tenth Circuit also has held that striking such testimony does not violate the
defendant's Fifth Amendment right to due process. United States v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d
1461, 1469 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that "[a] defendant cannot invoke due process or
compulsory process rights to immunize his witnesses from cross-examination on issues
relevant to the truth of the direct testimony") (citing United States v. Doddington, 822
F.2d 818, 822 (8th Cir. 1987)), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1036 (1992). The Tenth Circuit
quoted the Supreme Court, noting that the Sixth Amendment "'does not confer the right
to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system; one
cannot invoke the Sixth Amendment as a justification for presenting what might have
been a half-truth."' Id. at 1469 (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 412-13 (1988)
(citing United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 (1975))); see Doddington, 822 F.2d
at 821.
' If a defense witness invokes the privilege on cross-examination as to questions
solely relating to credibility, the defendant's right of compulsory process will be violat-
ed if the court strikes the witness's direct testimony. 3 COOK, supra note 3, § 18.3. For
example, the Seventh Circuit held that "it is constitutionally impermissible to strike
relevant and competent direct examination testimony where a defense witness on cross-
examination invokes the privilege against self-incrimination with respect to collateral
questions which relate only to his credibility and do not concern the subject matter of
his direct examination." Wisconsin ex rel. Monsoor v. Gagnon, 497 F.2d 1126, 1129-30
(7th Cir. 1974); see Lawson, 837 F.2d at 656.
" Lawson, 837 F.2d at 656 (citing United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d 887, 892 (9th
Cir. 1983)). The Fourth Circuit noted that "the purpose of cross-examination is to test
316 [Vol. 5:1
A CLASH OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
B. Invocation of the Self-Incrimination Privilege by a Prosecution Witness
If a prosecution witness invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination on cross-examination, a court may strike her direct testi-
mony if the cross-examination questions go to the substance of the direct
testimony.96 Prosecution witnesses, however, rarely invoke the Fifth
Amendment privilege-prosecutors are able to predict which witnesses
might invoke the privilege and tend to call only those witnesses who will
not invoke it. The prosecution either obtains immunity for these witnesses or
determines that their testimony will not likely be incriminating.' Addition-
ally, once a witness answers questions in a certain subject area on direct ex-
amination, that witness waives the privilege unless additional questions
would further incriminate her by substantially increasing the risk of incrimi-
nation or by venturing into a new subject area.98
Thus, a prosecutor generally only need be certain that the witness cannot
invoke the privilege in response to questions regarding the actions the prose-
cutor will address on direct examination.99 Defense counsel may question a
prosecution witness regarding crimes unrelated to the subject of her testimo-
ny in order to cast doubt on her credibility." ° Most courts have held, how-
ever, that when a witness invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege in re-
sponse to questions relating solely to credibility, the defense does not pos-
sess the right to have her direct testimony stricken.'
the credibility of the witness and the truthfulness of his earlier testimony." Id. The
Fourth Circuit did not provide specific examples of instances in which refusal to answer
would "frustrate" this purpose. See id. Presumably, the purpose of cross-examination
would be frustrated whenever a witness refuses to answer questions that could serve to
cast doubt on her credibility or truthfulness.
3 COOK, supra note 3, § 18.3.
Presumably, prosecutors interview their witnesses before calling them to testify.
During these interviews, prosecutors can determine if the information sought on direct
examination might incriminate the witness. Competent prosecutors will also anticipate
cross-examination questions that may incriminate the witness in ways not related to the
direct testimony, such as previous unrelated dishonest acts. Nevertheless, witnesses
generally are allowed to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege in response to such
questions without jeopardizing the admittance of direct testimony. See supra note 94
and accompanying text.
" Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951). Waiver of the privilege is not
limited to prosecution witnesses but applies to all witnesses. See supra notes 20-24 and
accompanying text.
9 The defense council generally will be able to question a witness only on matters
testified to on the direct examination. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 611(b).
100 Id.
101 3 COOK, supra note 3, § 18.3; see, e.g., United States v. Yip, 930 F.2d 142, 147
(2d Cir.) (holding that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is not
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Both a witness's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
and a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation and compulsory
process are vital to the American system of justice. When the two conflict,
efforts should be taken to preserve each right to the fullest extent possible.
In resolving the conflict, the societal interest in prosecuting all criminals,
including those who are called as witnesses in other trials, should be consid-
ered.
A. Defense Witness Immunity
With these ideals in mind, when a defense witness justifiably fears self-
incrimination but could offer potentially exculpatory testimony, the witness
should be granted immunity. The decision to grant immunity should be
made by the trial court, which should hold an evidentiary hearing to deter-
mine the validity of the asserted privilege as well as the probable existence
of exculpatory testimony. 0 2 In determining the exculpatory nature of the
testimony, a judge should view the testimony in the light most favorable to
the defendant because it is the jury's role to determine the credibility of
witnesses' testimony.
10 3
The decision to grant immunity to a defense witness should be based on
the defendant's need for the testimony, not prosecutorial concerns. " Pros-
ecutors make strategic decisions in determining whether to prosecute a de-
fendant. 5 The prosecution is never forced to allow a potential witness to
be immunized; it may drop the charges against the defendant and prosecute
the potential witness."° Although this may not be the most attractive alter-
native, the rights of a potentially innocent defendant must be given prece-
dence over the prosecution's desire to prosecute a witness.
Granting defense witnesses use immunity may avoid this infringement
on prosecutorial discretion. 7 A grant of use immunity preserves the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights-the witness can testify on the
abridged when a trial court refuses to strike the witness's testimony after the witness
has invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege on a collateral matter bearing solely on the
witness's credibility) (citing United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 822 (1963)), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 868 (1991).
102 See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 7,
§ 139.
103 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
"oa For a discussion of these concerns, see supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
5 See Elizabeth A. Parsons, Note, Shifting the Balance of Power: Prosecutorial
Discretion Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 417 (1994).
106 See Westen, supra note 39, at 170 n.477.
107 See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
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defendant's behalf-and preserves the witness's Fifth Amendment
right-the prosecution may not use the witness's testimony against her.
Additionally, granting use immunity preserves society's interests because the
government can still prosecute the witness for crimes to which she testifies.
Denying the defense the ability to immunize witnesses who could pro-
vide exculpatory testimony would constitute a denial of the defendant's con-
stitutional rights. Due process concerns weigh against this denial: because
the prosecution has the ability to immunize its witnesses, the defendant also
should be able to seek immunity for its witnesses."8 Nevertheless, courts
should base defense witness immunity grants on Sixth Amendment grounds.
The Sixth Amendment provides for compulsory process to present witnesses
in an accused's defense. Therefore, the ability to seek defense witness im-
munity need not rest on equitable due process rights that are based on the
principle of supplying a defendant with the tools available to the prosecu-
tion.
A compulsory process basis for defense witness immunity would also
preserve immunization against potential legislative attacks."° For example,
if defense witness immunity were based on due process equity grounds, the
legislature could remove the potential for inequity by denying prosecutors
the right to seek grants of immunity. A ban on prosecutorial immunity
would collapse the equitable foundation for defense witness immunity. Bas-
ing defense witness immunity on Sixth Amendment grounds avoids the
potential elimination of defense witness immunity, a mechanism that will be
necessary so long as the potential for incrimination exists.
B. Striking the Relevant Testimony of Witnesses Who Invoke the Privilege
on Cross-Examination
Courts should strike the relevant parts of direct testimony of prosecution
or defense witnesses who invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege upon cross-
examination if the invocation is to a non-collateral matter. The right to
cross-examine is fundamental to a fair trial."' Requiring courts to strike
0 Peter Westen argued for a due process basis for defense witness immunity: "If
convicting the guilty justifies immunity for government witnesses, exonerating the inno-
cent should justify immunity for defense witnesses .... Once the state makes immuni-
ty available to the prosecution it should not be permitted arbitrarily to withhold it from
the defense." Westen, supra note 38, at 170.
109 See supra note 25 and accompanying text (noting the statutory basis for state and
federal grants of immunity).
110 The Supreme Court has affirmed the importance of the right to cross-examine:
There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts have
been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of
confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement
for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal. Indeed, we
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direct testimony upon invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination
is a necessary remedy whenever a witness invokes the privilege on cross-ex-
amination regarding material facts elicited on direct examination.'
Although this principle is generally well-accepted, without defense wit-
ness immunity such strikes could unfairly tip the scales of justice in favor of
the prosecution. The prosecution could avoid the striking of its witness's
testimony by seeking a grant of immunity, but defendants would lack the
same ability and disproportionately lose key evidence. Thus, the practice of
striking testimony further supports grants of defense immunity."'
C. Calling Witnesses Who Will Invoke the Privilege
Parties should not call witnesses simply to have them invoke their Fifth
Amendment privilege in the jury's presence." 3 Invocation of the Fifth
Amendment is not the equivalent of admitting guilt, but jurors may believe
otherwise." 4 Because the purpose of a trial is to seek the truth, calling a
witness solely to invoke the privilege wastes time and permits improper
inferences and therefore should be prohibited. If a witness invokes the privi-
lege against self-incrimination on a collateral matter, however, inferences are
permissible because they help the jury assess the witness's credibility."5
CONCLUSION
The United States Constitution protects the rights of criminal defendants,
both actual and potential, by providing actual and potential defendants the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and by providing actual
have expressly declared that to deprive an accused of the right to cross-examine
the witnesses against him is a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
due process of law.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965).
... See generally 3 COOK, supra note 3, § 18.3 (addressing the potential for testimo-
ny to be stricken).
112 This basis by its nature rests on due process grounds.
113 But see Cook, supra note 87, at 210-19 (arguing in favor of allowing defense
witnesses to be called simply to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination).
114 See WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2272; Charles H. Rabon, Jr., Note, Evening the
Odds in Civil Litigation: A Proposed Methodology for Using Adverse Inferences When
Nonparty Witnesses Invoke the Fifth Amendment, 42 VAND. L. REV. 507 (1989).
"' Thus, juries should be allowed to learn of invocations of the privilege only if they
can use that knowledge in determining the credibility of the witness's testimony. To
allow juror knowledge of the invocation of the privilege by those who have not provid-
ed other testimony under the guise that the jury may draw inferences that it could use in
determining the credibility of other witness's testimony would be too speculative and
unrelated a goal to justify the potential for improper inferences. See WIGMORE, supra
note 8, § 2272.
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defendants with the Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation and compulso-
ry process. When these two fundamental rights conflict, courts should pre-
serve both rights to the greatest extent possible. Granting defense witnesses
use immunity when the witnesses's testimony is potentially exculpatory
serves the interests that both amendments seek to protect. Further, that grant
serves the public interest in allowing- the prosecution of all criminals, in-
cluding those called as witnesses in other trials.
Moreover, because cross-examination is essential to the judicial process,
testimony that is not subject to cross-examination should be stricken regard-
less of whether the testimony is that of a defense witness or a prosecution
witness.
Providing grants of immunity to certain defense witnesses will help
ensure that prosecutors cannot prevent the trier of fact from hearing excul-
patory testimony. Because the federal circuits are split regarding defense
witness immunity, this issue is ripe for Supreme Court review. In order to
ensure lasting protection of defendant's rights, the Court, and the lower
courts that address the issue, should base defense witness immunity on Sixth
Amendment compulsory process grounds. This grant could help prevent the
tragedy that may exist in those jurisdictions not recognizing defense witness
immunity-the tragedy of punishing unjustly accused defendants for crimes
that they did not commit.
RODERICK R. INGRAM
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